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THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A
SYMPOSIUM
AN INTRODUCTION
BY JEROME A. BARON*
The Kentucky Law Journal in choosing to conduct a sym-
posium on recent developments in media law has chosen for
itself a topic both significant and mercurial. The significance
of the law of freedom of expression needs no demonstration in
a society ordered by the first amendment. But we should also
be aware of the mercurial or elusive quality of efforts to at-
tempt to capture the meaning of freedom of expression in the
context of specific controversies between the individual and the
media or between government and the media.
As a result of the influential voice of Mr. Justice Stewart,
considerable attention has been directed to the view that the
Press Clause of the first amendment gives special and unique
protection to the press as an institution.' Indeed, Mr. Justice
Stewart has suggested that the press, as a matter of constitu-
tional design, was intended to serve as a fourth branch of gov-
ernment.2 From such a perspective, legal obligations which fall
upon the press should be regarded with particular suspicion.
The Free Speech Clause of the first amendment, on the other
hand, is seen as protecting the free expression rights of the rest
of us. The troublesome implication of this view is that the Free
Speech Clause confers less in the way of constitutional protec-
tion on individuals than the Press Clause confers on the media.
The special status of the press theory is an entirely understand-
able phenomenon. Much of its origin may be attributed to the
useful role the press played in ferreting out the sins of govern-
ment during the Watergate affair. The special status of the
* Dean and Professor of Law, George Washington University National Law Cen-
ter.
, See Mr. Justice Stewart's 1975 Yale Law School lecture on the meaning of the
Press Clause, Stewart, "Or of the Press" 26 HAsTiNGs L.J. 631 (1975).
1 Id. at 633-34.
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press theory may at least be understood partially as a post-
Watergate phenomenon.
If one reflects on the contents of this first amendment
symposium issue, it will be apparent, I believe, that our first
amendment theory is now preoccupied with the question of
whether the status of the party seeking first amendment pro-
tection should affect his claim to that protection. Should there
be a hierarchy of first amendment rights? Should the journalist
be accorded a first amendment status that would be denied to
others? The articles in this symposium directly grapple with
these questions.
Professor Yasser's paper in this symposium dealing with
the cross-ownership question raises an issue that carries rever-
berations from that debate. If a newspaper is forbidden by the
FCC to own a broadcast station in the same community, does
that restriction unconstitutionally deny to newspapers an op-
tion for expression that is open to others? The Supreme Court
in the cross-ownership case rejected this argument.' Justice
Marshall responded to it by saying that newspapers would still
have an opportunity to establish a broadcast voice in a com-
munity in which it did not already publish a newspaper.' In the
cross-ownership case, the Court chose to emphasize the first
amendment rights of the public over an absolute first amend-
ment claim by the media. The Court, in rejecting the argument
that a cross-ownership ban forfeited, contrary to the first
amendment, a newspaper's right to a broadcast voice in the
community in which it published, chose to rely on the Red
Lion5 decision, which gave priority to public rights and to di-
versity of expression, rather than on Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo,6 which extolled the paramountcy of media
rights of expression.7 The reasoning of the cross-ownership case
is at least implicitly a rejection of the special status of the
media thesis.
Similarly, Professor Hunter's paper on Herbert v. Lando
3 FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
'Id. at 800.
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
6 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
See FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 800 (1978).
99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979).
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involves yet another chapter in the debate on whether a special
constitutional status should be accorded to the press. Judge
Oakes of the Second Circuit had specifically relied in his con-
currence on Mr. Justice Stewart's special status9 thesis for a
conclusion justifying the creation of yet another legal obsta-
cle-a doctrine of editorial privilege-in the path of individual
plaintiffs seeking redress for libel under the Sullivan-Gertz'0
rules. Further revision of the Sullivan-Gertz doctrine to accom-
modate the actual malice test to the objectives of a first
amendment theory which accords special status to the press
would have been an unworkable endeavor. Either the Sullivan-
Gertz rules giving citizen critics the benefit of an actual malice
standard should be applied with equal vigor to non-media as
well as media defendants or else the proponents of an editorial
privilege amendment to the Sullivan-Gertz doctrine should
frankly confront what I believe is the true source of their dis-
pleasure. The real point of their discomfort, in my opinion, is
the actual malice test itself in that its use in federal discovery
burdens editorial judgment. But this burden, as was empha-
sized in the Supreme Court decision in Lando, was assumed to
be part of the bag and baggage of the actual malice test when
it was fashioned in the New York Times v. Sullivan case. The
accommodation between the values of untrammeled publica-
tion and the values of reputational integrity was struck-ad-
visedly-in the actual malice test. In the Sullivan case, a ma-
jority of the Supreme Court declined to give an absolute prior-
ity to untrammeled publication over redress for reputational
injury by creating an absolute privilege for the benefit of libel
defendants in suits brought by public plaintiffs. Mr. Justice
Black in the Sullivan case had argued-unsuccessfully-for the
creation of just such an absolute privilege."
Fortunately, the Supreme Court did not recognize a spe-
cial status for the press in their decision of the Lando case.
Professor Hunter suggests a sensible and sensitive approach to
discovery in libel litigation that might help resolve Lando-type
9 568 F.2d 974, 988 (2d Cir. 1977).
to See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
i See New York Times v. Sullivan, Inc., 376 U.S. 254, 293-97 (1964).
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problems in the future. Such an approach is more receptive to
the competing interests involved than that which would have
been provided by the recognition of an editorial privilege in the
Lando case. The interest of the media defendant in being free
to engage in vigorous criticism of the public issues and public
personalities of the day is extremely important, but the interest
of the libel plaintiff in having at least a fair opportunity to
attempt to vindicate his reputation in a libel suit is also impor-
tant. That reputational interest should not be too easily subor-
dinated in favor of an uncharted and imprecisely defined claim
of editorial privilege.
In their article on the Zurcher'2 case, Professor Dwight
Teeter and Professor Griffin Singer make an effective and vig-
orous case for undoing the result in the Zurcher case. Whether
the Zurcher decision will actually result in having the chilling
and intimidating effect on journalism which they prophesy is,
of course, as yet unclear. But perhaps a few additional things
about Zurcher should be said. The Court was not passing on
the wisdom of police searches of the newsroom but rather on
whether the first amendment imposed any special or indepen-
dent limitations on the workings of the fourth amendment.
Professors Teeter and Singer think that this issue should have
been resolved differently than it was. This controversy, of
course, is merely another thread of the same color which
clothes this entire symposium issue. Does the first amendment
command that the media be given a special claim for exemp-
tion with respect to legal obligations that would otherwise fall
on them in a neutral way? Teeter and Singer write tellingly of
their lack of faith in the view that the press would be treated
fairly by a "neutral magistrate." Journalists are right to fear
any new and explicit infringement on their freedom. Whether
the Zurcher decision is a new infringement or merely a recogni-
tion of what had been implicit in our law anyway-that the
fourth amendment applies to media and non-media alike-is,
of course, the issue. If Zurcher is merely an explicit recognition
of what had been implicit, then perhaps Zurcher can be viewed
as a clarification of the law since it constitutes at least an
incremental step toward recognition of a contextual approach
12 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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to first amendment problems.
Arguably, Zurcher is responsive to such a contextual ap-
proach. In Zurcher, Mr. Justice White for the Court specifically
observed that where newspaper premises are the subject of a
search, the requirements for specificity in the search warrant
would be heightened: "Where the materials sought to be seized
may be protected by the First Amendment, the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment must be applied with 'scrupulous
exactitude.' "13 Furthermore, the Court observed: "Where pre-
sumptively protected materials are sought to be seized, the
warrant requirement should be administered to leave as little
as possible to the discretion or whim of the officer in the
field.""It is, of course, true that the Court said in Zurcher that the
text of the "Fourth Amendment has itself struck the balance
between privacy and public need."' 5 But it should also be borne
in mind that the Court stressed that in the context of a search
of a newspaper, a particular measure of exactitude would be
required if a search warrant is to withstand constitutional at-
tack.
It is important to remember this requirement and not
allow dissatisfaction with the Zurcher decision to be carried to
the point that an overestimation of the impact of the decision
itself becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The problem of whether the first amendment should be
interpreted to provide a special degree of protection to the
media or whether a contextual approach should be taken has
come up in other cases in the 1978 Term as well. Thus, in
Houchins v. KQED, Inc.," the Court was presented with the
following issue: Do the "news media have a constitutional right
of access to a county jail, over and above that of other
persons?"' 7 In Houchins, this question was asked in the context
of whether the news media had a special right "to interview
inmates and make sound recordings, films, and photographs
for publication and broadcasting by newspapers, radio and
11 Id. at 564.
Id.
" Id. at 559.
" 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
' Id. at 3.
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television."'" In Houchins, with only seven justices partici-
pating in the decision, the Court, per Chief Justice Burger in
an opinion for the Court, joined only by Justices White and
Rehnquist, concluded that "the media have no special right of
access to- the Alameda County Jail different from or greater
than that accorded the public generally."' 9
In Houchins, Mr. Justice Stewart joined in the result be-.
cause he believed that the scope of the preliminary injunction
issued by the district court was unwarranted. However, in a
separate concurrence he stated that he thought that the televi-
sion station involved in the case, KQED of San Francisco, was
entitled to some limited injunctive relief. Futhermore, Justice
Stewart made the intriguing remark in Houchins that the
"Constitution does no more than assure the public and the
press equal access once government has opened its doors." 0
Does this mean that Justice Stewart has abandoned the pre-
cepts of his special status for the press theory? Not necessarily.
The point, Justice Stewart says, is that although both the
press and the public should have equal access to public facili-
ties such as prisons, "the concept of equal access must be ac-
corded more flexibility in order to accommodate the practical
distinctions between the press and the general public."'" Jus-
tice Stewart observes that the fact that the first amendment
"speaks separately of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press is no constitutional accident."2 The press, in his view,
has special needs. Equal access for the press may mean some-
thing different from equal access for a member of the public.
An ordinary citizen "can grasp reality with his own eyes and
ears." 21 But "equal access" may not really be provided to a
television reporter unless he can "use cameras and sound
equipment."24
These comments by Mr. Justice Stewart in Houchins are
particularly stimulating and provocative because they suggest
Is Id.
"g Id. at 16.
20 Id.
21 Id.





we may be taking his comments about a distinct meaning for
the Press Clause too literally. It may be that a special status
for the press is better understood as merely a plea for recogni-
tion that even conferral of equality under the first amendment
is achievable only if it is approached in a specific context.
Because of the nature of the broadcast journalist's task, first
amendment access to public facilities may provide a different
measure of access to him than that which must be provided to
a member of the general public. In my view, this is a far more
acceptable rendition of the significance of separate mention of
the freedom of the press in the first amendment than is an
interpretation of the Press Clause which would place the media
apart from others with respect to the reach of legal obligation.2
Problems of whether distinct degrees of protection should
be attributed to the Free Press Clause and the Free Speech
Clause, respectively, arise in other areas as well, such as the
continuing dilemma of resolving the competing claims of free
press and fair trial. In his paper, Professor Rendleman dis-
cusses the procedural aspects of this dilemma. While noting
that the Nebraska PresS2 decision has restricted the likelihood
that "gag orders" will be directed against the press,- Professor
Rendleman indicates that such orders are still being issued
against the press directly or against them indirectly by restric-
tions on lawyers from speaking to the media concerning pend-
ing criminal litigation.2s Professor Rendleman argues for better
procedural safeguards to protect the press when faced with a
"gag order." In particular, he urges that the media be given
pre-order notice and an opportunity to challenge the order,
that the media be given standing to challenge "gag orders"
2 See Van Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming A 'Preferred Position',
28 HASTINGS L.J. 761 (1977). Cf. Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VIA. L.
REv. 731 (1977) (the Free Press Clause prevents the press from being singled out for
special burdens or benefits).
25 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
7 See also Prettyman, Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart: Have We Seen the
Last of Prior Restraints on the Reporting of Judicial Proceedings?, 20 ST. Louis U. L.J.
654 (1975-76).
2 See generally Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Central South Carolina Chapter v. Martin, 431 F.
Supp. 1182 (D.S.C. 1977); aff'd, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977); Hirschkop, Soc'y of




directed at their informants (trial participants),that prompt
appellate review of gag orders be provided, and that the collat-
eral bar rule be applied only if the media has challenged the
order or failed to use an opportunity to challenge an order.
"Gag orders" directed not, at the media but at lawyers
pose special problems regarding whether the Free Press Clause
and the Free Speech Clause provide different degrees of protec-
tion. Thus, while the press may be free from direct silence
orders, their informants, particularly their lawyer informants,
may well have to suffer in silence. Are the first amendment
rights of lawyers entitled to less recognition than that of
journalists? Here again we see the workings of the current
cleavage in treatment between the media claimant to first
amendment protection and the non-media claimant to first
amendment protection. Mr. Justice Erickson's paper deals
with a related issue-the first amendment aspects of limita-
tions on confidentiality of lawyer disciplinary and disability
proceedings.
Mr. Justice Erickson, in his paper, has addressed himself
to the problems presented by Landmark Communications, Inc.
v. Virginia.9 In Landmark, the Supreme Court held that the
first amendment does not permit a newspaper to be punished
for publishing accurate information about proceedings before
a state judicial review commission. In Landmark, as in
Nebraska Press, the Court, professing to use the clear and pres-
ent danger doctrine, invalidated a barrier to press publication
of information concerning the administration of justice. Would
it be permissible to do an end run around the essential holdings
of Nebraska Press and Landmark and allow restrictions on the
sources of news-in this context, lawyers-that would not be
permissible against journalists', the disseminators of news? The
question is whether the state should have more latitude with
respect to imposing restraints on the expression of lawyers than
it does with respect to the imposition of such restraints on
journalists. Mr. Justice Erickson appears to conclude that nar-
rowly designed rules carefully written to target particular ex-
pression by lawyers may well be valid.
435 U.S. 829 (1978).
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The Supreme Court has yet to pass directly on the ques-
tion of the permissibility of some restraints on the expression
of lawyers, a matter which it left, perhaps advisedly, to the
lower courts in order that they might wrestle with the problem.
Suppose, however, that the Court eventually decides to review
a case raising these issues and that the Court by a majority
reaches a result consistent with the views expressed in Mr.
Justice Erickson's paper. Such a result would constitute, at
least implicitly, acceptance of a special status for the press. It
has been argued that use of the clear and present danger doc-
trine as the mechanism to enforce the heavy presumption
against the validity of prior restraints in the form of "gag or-
ders" against the press in reality constitutes the equivalent of
an absolute prohibition against media "gag orders". 0 If this is
true, "gag orders" against journalists would be at least in prac-
tice a constitutional thing of the past while "gag orders"
against lawyers would be much more likely to survive first
amendment attack. Such a consequence would indeed make
the strength of first amendment claims dependent upon the
status of the claimant. The free press claim asserted by a jour-
nalist would be ranked higher in this new hierarchical ap-
proach to first amendment protection than the free speech
claim of a lawyer. Although Professor Rendleman suggests that
this distinction is based on a murky interpretation of the prior
restraint doctrine itself and not the clear and present danger
doctrine, the result is the same. Such a result would indeed
give a special and distinct meaning to the Press Clause of the
first amendment.
It is still too early to conclude that the Supreme Court has
decisively rejected the theory that the Press Clause of the first
amendment confers distinct protections on members of the in-
stitutional press. To be sure, most of the signs in the work of
the Court in the 1978 Term point to that conclusion. Thus, in
First National Bank v. Bellotti,3' the Court held that a state
could not validly restrict the free speech of business corpora-
tions by prohibiting them from attempting to influence voting
in a state referendum on matters of public importance not
3 See Prettyman, supra note 27.
31 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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affecting the property or business of the corporation.
Justice Stewart's separate concurrence in the Landmark
case is congenial to an interpretation of the first amendment
that accords members of the press a constitutional status not
enjoyed by others. The majority of the Court in Landmark
concludes that the state is not justified, on the basis of a puz-
zling formulation of the clear and present danger doctrine, in
punishing newspaper publication of the proceedings of a state
judicial review commission. Mr. Justice Stewart reaches the
same result by quite another route. The statute is invalid be-
cause it is directed to the press. Mr. Justice Stewart stated that
he found "nothing in the Constitution to prevent Virginia from
punishing those who violate"32 the confidentiality of its Judi-
cial Inquiry and Review Commission proceeding. Justice Stew-
art then continued: "But in this case Virginia has extended its
law to punish a newspaper, and that it cannot constitutionally
do."33 But surely such a reading of the first amendment is at
least open to question. The focus of such an approach is to give
radical new significance to the Press Clause and at the same
time to radically de-emphasize the Free Speech Clause.
Doesn't the Free Speech Clause provide at least some basis in
the Constitution against state restrictions on those who breach
state-imposed confidentiality? It is possible, of course, as we
noted earlier in the discussion of Justice Stewart's concurrence
in Houchins, that his advocacy of a special degree of protection
for the press by virtue of the Press Clause has been interpreted
in too literal and wooden a way.
If the Landmark case contains the seeds of a doctrine per-
mitting a greater degree of restriction on the expression of law-
yers involved in disciplinary and disability proceedings than
would be available if the expression of journalists were at issue,
then it would be hard to conclude, as Chief Justice Burger does
in his concurrence in Bellotti, that "the First Amendment does
not 'belong' to any definable category of persons or entities: It
belongs to all who exercise its freedoms."34 Indeed, in Bellotti,
Mr. Justice Powell for the Court rejected the notion that busi-
32 Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 849 (1978).
33 Id.
31 First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978).
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ness corporations might enjoy less first amendment protection
than do others: "The inherent worth of the speech in terms ot
its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the
identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union,
or individual.
'35
In the contemporary controversy about the interpretation
of the first amendment, we are not done with the quarrel be-
tween a hierarchical or an egalitarian approach to first amend-
ment protection even if we decide to say that under the regime
of the first amendment the media are more equal than others.
For even if the media are deemed favored, claims of hierarchy
and preference persist. In the view of the electronic media, they
are the stepchild of the first amendment. 6 Unlike the print
media, they are burdened with a harness-the law of broadcast
regulation with its obligations of fairness, equal time, and serv-
ice in the public interest-not required of the print media.
Thus, even if the Court should find that the Press Clause pro-
tects the media in a more direct and explicit way than it does
others, the question of whether all media require the same
measure of protection presents another dilemma. Professor
Thain suggests that the Pacifica37 case provides at least part of
the answer to this question. In prohibiting the broadcast of the
"seven dirty words," the Court noted that restraints are per-
mitted on the broadcast media that are not permitted on the
print media .3 Thus the Court upheld a restriction upon speech,
neither misleading nor deceptive, based on the type of media
and the possible audience of that media. Extrapolating from
Pacifica, Professor Thain predicts that the proposed FTC rules
which would restrict certain types of advertising directed to-
ward children should withstand constitutional scrutiny. Such
advertising, Professor Thain argues, even if not proven to be
misleading or deceptive, is subject to regulation because it is
broadcast and because it is directed toward children.
A related question is addressed in Professor Heller's paper.
Professor Heller suggests that, although the Supreme Court
3 Id. at 777.
1' For an exposition of this view, see Van Alstyne, The Mdbius Strip of the First
Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 S. CAR. L. REv. 539 (1978).




has struck down the "commercial speech" exception to the first
amendment, it has created new problems by requiring an in-
quiry into the "possibility" that speech may "mislead the pub-
lic."39 Instead of a hierarchy among the various forms of the
media, we are faced with a hierarchy based upon the nature of
the speech, i.e., is the speech capable of being "empirically"
tested for truthfulness? Rather than venture into these
"uncharted"40 waters, Professor Heller suggests a more useful
distinction, one based on the value of speech to the "effective
functioning of free government."
The thesis that the Press Clause confers a special and
unique status on the press did not fare well in the Supreme
Court this past term as the papers in this symposium illustrate.
The editorial privilege case,4' the media cross-ownership case,42
the access to prisons case,43 the newspaper search case,44 and
the case involving newspaper publication of the confidential
proceedings of a state judicial review commission4 5 may all be
viewed as constituting in some fashion a repudiation of the
special status for the press thesis. We would do well to re-
call-before we reach any ultimate conclusions on recent advo-
cacy on behalf of a hierarchical approach to the first amend-
ment-the wise words of Mr. Justice Black in his dissent in
Kovacs v. Cooper:"
There are many people who have ideas that they wish to
disseminate but who do not have enough money to own or
control publishing plants, newspapers, radios, moving pic-
ture studios, or chains of show places. Yet everybody knows
the vast reaches of these powerful channels of communication
which from the very nature of our economic system must be
under the control and guidance of comparatively few people.
On the other hand, public speaking is done by many men of
divergent minds with no centralized control over the ideas
they entertain so as to limit the causes they espouse. It is no
31 Friedman v. Rogers, 99 S. Ct. 887, 895-96 (1979).
40 Friedman v. Rogers, 99 S. Ct. 887, 894 n.9 (1979).
11 Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979).
,2 FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
43 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
11 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
11 Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
41 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949).
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reflection on the value of preserving freedom for dissemina-
tion of the ideas of publishers of newspapers, magazines, and
other literature, to believe that transmission of ideas through
public speaking is also essential to the sound thinking of a
fully informed citizenry.

